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Abstract:  Driver Machine Interface (DMI) is a slave unit of the train onboard computer 
in the ERTMS automatic train control system. The SAFEDMI project aimed at the devel-
opment of a DMI which fulfills the requirements of Safety Integrity Level 2 according to 
the CENELEC development standards. The main challenges were (i) the reduction of the 
hardware complexity and costs by implementing the safety mechanisms in software and 
(ii) provide a safe and secure wireless communication interface to support diagnostics and 
maintenance. This paper presents the requirements, the design of the architecture and the 
wireless communication protocol, and the evaluation of the applied solutions. 
Keywords: Safety-critical systems, safe wireless communication, quantitative evaluation 
1. Introduction 
Railway Automatic Train Control (ATC) systems are based both on trackside and on-
board systems and their evolution has followed the introduction of new technologies. The 
increasing level of train traffic and the spread of high-speed rail lines are demanding an 
increasing safety level in the ATC systems. In order to ensure compatibility and interop-
erability between the ATC systems produced in the various European countries, the Euro-
pean Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS/ETCS) programme has been set up to 
provide unique functional and non-functional standard requirements [1]. 
The ERTMS train-borne equipment includes, among others, the European Vital 
Computer (EVC) and the Driver Machine Interface (DMI). The EVC is the core of the on-
board ATC system; it supervises the movement of the train by using the information re-
ceived from the trackside systems. The DMI is the interface between the EVC and the 
driver; it acquires driver’s commands and transforms EVC commands in graphical and 
audible information according to [3]. The standard ERTMS DMI does not have to fulfil 
safety requirements although it operates in a critical context. These days many railway 
operators are beginning to require higher safety levels and reduced costs. Moreover, the
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use of emerging wireless communication technologies is demanded to speed up the DMI 
configuration and software/firmware upgrade, thus avoiding mechanical operations. 
The SAFEDMI project1 aimed at developing a DMI that fulfils the requirements of 
Safety Integrity Level 2 (SIL 2) according to the CENELEC development standards 
[4][5][6]. The main challenges of this project were (i) the reduction of the hardware com-
plexity and costs by implementing the safety mechanisms in software and (ii) provide a 
safe and secure wireless communication interface to support diagnostics and maintenance. 
To accomplish this task, the SAFEDMI project defined and organized the DMI require-
ments into four main groups: (i) non functional requirements related to the hardware char-
acteristics; (ii) functional requirements related to ERTMS functionalities and DMI opera-
tional modes; (iii) safety requirements mainly focused on LCD display, keyboard, on-line 
device testing; (iv) wireless requirements related to malicious attacks, integrity checking, 
authentication, and performance. 
The proposed solution is compliant with CENELEC standards. More specifically, it 
ensures that no single random hardware component failure mode is hazardous by using (i) 
composite, (ii) reactive or (iii) inherent fail-safety techniques as suggested in EN 50129 
[4]. Furthermore, as suggested in EN 50128 [5], defensive programming, fault detection 
mechanisms, error detecting codes have been used in the design phase to fulfil SIL 2 re-
quirements. Finally the DMI satisfies the requirements specified in EN 50155 [7] and in 
EN 50121-3-2 [8], respectively, for electronic equipments used on rolling stock for con-
trol, regulation, protection supply, and for electro-magnetic compatibility. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reports a description of the design task in 
terms of fail-safe fault tolerant architecture and protocols for wireless maintenance. The 
feasibility of the technical solutions adopted have been proved with the realization of a 
prototype. In Section 3 the evaluation task is described to demonstrate that the envisaged 
solution allows reaching SIL 2. Finally the conclusions are reported in Section 4. 
2. Design of the DMI 
The internal architecture of the DMI was designed to address several demands. To reduce 
the costs, safety was ensured mainly by software mechanisms, and the wireless communi-
cation architecture was designed to include off-the-shelf solutions. The following subsec-
tions present an overview of the design decisions. 
2.1 DMI operational modes 
The DMI has five operational modes: Start-up, Configuration, Normal, Suspect and Safe 
mode (state). Figure 1 presents these operational modes and how they are interrelated. 
In Start-up mode the initialization procedures and the thorough testing of all devices 
are performed. Diagnostic functionalities are also available. In Configuration mode safe 
software upload and configuration are performed by means of wireless communication. 
After a successful configuration session, a restart of the DMI is needed. In Normal mode 
the DMI produces graphical and audio information to support train driving, as well as it 
                                                          
 
 
1
 IST FP6 STREP-031413 Safe Driver Machine Interface (DMI) for ERTMS Automatic Train 
Control. http://www.safedmi.org 
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acquires and processes driver’s commands. Moreover, periodic testing activities are per-
formed and diagnostic functionalities are available. 
In each of the previous modes, whenever an error is detected, a transition to the Sus-
pect mode is forced. Suspect mode allows going back to Start-up mode, to perform at-
tempts to restart. Using a specific mechanism [19], it is possible to set a maximum num-
ber of allowed consecutive restart attempts. Moreover, a maximum time to restart the 
DMI is set. This mechanism allows increasing the availability of train missions, since 
DMI can automatically restart from transient faults and become fully working again, thus 
avoiding that the EVC activates the emergency brakes and interrupts the train mission. 
 
Figure 1: SAFEDMI operational modes 
Safe mode is entered when a permanent malfunctioning is detected and attempts to re-
start the DMI have failed. This mode prevents further operations of the DMI. 
2.2 DMI Architecture and Safety Mechanisms 
Regarding the hardware, the DMI has a non-redundant architecture including OTS com-
ponents. Absence of hardware redundancy imposes a more sophisticated software archi-
tecture, since safety requirements need to be accomplished only by software mechanisms. 
Regarding the software architecture, for each operational mode we defined five mod-
ules that are activated/deactivated when the DMI transits from one mode to another. 
Global monitoring performs the role of an execution monitor, a software watchdog, a log 
manager, and a diagnostic manager; it recognizes the conditions that cause an operational 
mode change of the DMI and performs the operations needed to reconfigure the system 
when a mode change happens. Checks and tests performs checking and testing activities. 
Operations module contains the software objects involved in the implementation of the 
functional requirements of the operational modes, as visualization and audio emission 
procedures. Communications module handles the diagnosis, maintenance and EVC related 
communications, and I/O manager contains the drivers of the DMI hardware devices. 
Regarding the safety mechanisms applied to guarantee SIL 2, in SAFEDMI the reac-
tive fail-safety principle was adopted [4]. As a consequence, efficient fault detection plays 
a crucial role. According to the safety standards, the potential hazardous effects of sys-
tematic faults (especially software design faults) were handled by means of fault preven-
tion and removal during development, i.e., the quality and safety management conditions 
corresponding to SIL 2. Fault detection addressed random faults that cover both perma-
nent and transient faults. 
In Start-up mode permanent hardware faults are addressed by efficient test procedures 
with high fault coverage, for example march test algorithms [21] for RAM and flash 
memory. In Normal and Configuration modes on-line (run-time) fault detection is applied. 
For detecting latent random permanent faults in the hardware components periodic testing 
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is performed. In these operational modes the execution time of the tests is an important 
issue, this way fast (but less efficient) versions of the test procedures applied in the Start-
up mode were developed. For example, instead of a march C- test covering an extensive 
fault model, a simpler version is applied [21]. Considering passive objects (files, configu-
ration data) an integrity checking procedure is instead adopted. 
Active permanent faults and random transient faults in the hardware components are 
detected on the basis of their effects on software execution. Considering (i) the recom-
mendations of the safety standards [4] [5], (ii) the SAFEDMI specific requirements and 
(iii) the analysis of the peculiarities of the different modules of the DMI, we identified the 
following three categories of safety mechanisms: data acceptance/credibility checks, con-
trol flow monitoring and multiple computation and comparison. The first category is ap-
plied mainly in configuration operations (by error detection codes and integrity checking 
executed to check transmitted files). The second category is applied in the test and checks 
module, in the global monitoring module and in the operations module (in this last mod-
ule, control flow monitoring is applied in the audio management function and in the state 
change procedure). Finally, the third category is applied in the visualization and keyboard 
processing functions. A more detailed description of the DMI architecture can be found in 
[20]. 
2.3 The Wireless Communication Architecture and Protocols 
Traditionally, maintenance operations are performed by maintenance personnel physically 
attaching a maintenance device to the on-board equipments. To improve procedures, a 
motivation exists to replace cables with a wireless connection enabling remote execution 
of these operations. In this way a wireless link is introduced between a Maintenance Cen-
ter (MC) and one or more DMIs located in trains in a maintenance area or in open tracks. 
To enable a cost-efficient solution off-the-shelf (OTS) wireless equipment has been 
incorporated. However, typical OTS wireless equipments do not inherently target the de-
pendability, safety and security requirements existing in industrial applications. Thus, the 
project aimed at applying new functions. The additional functions required to provide a 
safe, secure and dependable wireless communication solution lead to increased resource 
consumption on the peer systems. The primary operations being performed in the DMI are 
safety critical and efforts must be made to minimize impact on such operations when in-
troducing wireless communication capabilities. To manage these issues the basic concept 
of the proposed communication architecture is the introduction of a Bridge Device (BD) 
installed next to the DMI in the train. The BD separates an open wireless communication 
system [6] from the MC to the BD, and a closed wired communication system from the 
BD to the DMI. Thus, the BD manages the most resource requiring functions in relation to 
establishing and maintaining wireless communication. This approach allows reducing the 
processing load on the DMI and enables the use of state-of-the-art methods for crypto-
graphic protection of wireless transmissions. In addition the BD can act as a firewall and 
traffic policing entity toward the DMI to minimize impact from faulty equipment and ma-
licious attacks. Altogether, the entire communication system is composed of three de-
vices: the DMI itself, the BD and the MC. 
In order to fulfill the requirements on wireless communication between the DMI and 
the MC, a special purpose protocol layer, called Safety Layer is developed. The role of the 
safety layer is to manage interactions between the OTS protocols and services as well as 
to add additional functions enabling a required integrity level of transferred data. This 
layer is split into two sub-layers: Low Safety Layer (LowSL) located at MC and BD and 
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High Safety Layer (HighSL) located at MC and DMI. This split is motivated by a classifi-
cation of communication safety requirements into two levels: (i) communication at the 
application level; (ii) message transmission over open wireless communication system. 
The LowSL is responsible for providing a secure connection between BD and MC. The 
purpose of HighSL is to guarantee a safe, secure and dependable end-to-end connection. 
The main tasks of HighSL include: 
- Performance monitoring: monitoring of wired and wireless link conditions to enable 
autonomous and user initiated fault recovery actions, 
- Session control, including the ability to terminate sessions, e.g., in case of unrecover-
able faults identified in performance monitoring, 
- Key management: management of hardware based keys used to authenticate secure 
BD-MC connection, 
- Safety aware application interface providing information about unrecoverable faults 
and monitoring of excessive communication events for additional fault management. 
Figure 2 illustrates the communication protocol stack and the traffic flows. 
 
Figure 2: Protocol components, connections and functional components 
Using an open medium the data transferred on the wireless link needs to be protected. For 
safety reasons it must be ensured that a malicious party cannot access the DMI or alter 
data being transferred to and from the DMI. This is achieved by strong authentication and 
integrity checking methods.  
Table 1: IPsec configuration used for the LowSL safe communication 
Requirements IPsec configuration 
IP IPv4 
Confidentiality ESP using AES-CBC to provide strong standardized 
encryption 
Protection against data insertion, re-
sequencing, corruption, masquerade, 
deletion 
Data integrity and origin checks are provided in ESP 
with HMAC using the cryptographic hash function 
SHA-2  
Repetition/ replay protection ESP with packet sequence numbering 
Host-to-host security Transport mode 
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In addition, encryption must ensure that a third party cannot retrieve the contents of the 
data being transferred. IPsec [25] is an OTS security framework which has been applied in 
the LowSL. Its specification provides numerous configuration options making IPsec a 
versatile solution and allowing fine-tuning the algorithmic choices to particular needs. 
Table 1 contains the configuration chosen to provide a secure channel between the MC and 
the BD. 
      Considering L2 protocols, different wireless technologies (e.g., UMTS, WiMAX, 
WLAN 802.11) can be used depending on the varying requirements of different use case 
scenarios. This has been accounted for in the design of the BD: it can contain multiple 
wireless interfaces while the Safety Layer may adapt its service level to the properties of a 
given wireless link. The redundancy provided by multiple interfaces also includes a wired 
link as a back-up solution. This may be necessary in cases when the wireless connection 
cannot be established or cannot provide the required throughput. 
The communication stack has been designed to be generic and not only support exist-
ing diagnostic and maintenance applications; i.e., the communication stack is not tightly 
coupled to applications. However, the knowledge of application communication require-
ments enabled the introduction of different supported traffic classes representing different 
requirements for throughput and integrity levels. 
2.4 The DMI Prototype 
The design activities provided inputs to the implementation task aimed at demonstrating 
the feasibility of the envisaged technical solution by means of a prototype. To allow a 
parallel implementation, the prototype was organized in three main parts: (i) safety related 
architecture; (ii) wireless maintenance protocols; (iii) overall final integration. 
The first prototype focused on train mission and safety mechanisms. The prototype 
was realized using OTS hardware components and the VRTX operating system [16]. The 
DMI was connected to the ASF ERTMS on-board equipment with a protocol compliant to 
the UNISIG standard [2]. Moreover an ASF track simulator was used for generating the 
events of a train mission. By means of a diagnostic tool (that showed the value of software 
variables) the operation of the main safety mechanisms were observed, namely the opera-
tional mode changes under the control of the execution monitor, the activation of dupli-
cated computation and comparison applied to safe acknowledgment, and the activity of 
control flow checking in relation to audio output management. 
A DMI Simulator was also developed to anticipate and simplify final integration ac-
tivities. It is an application running on a PC and includes the same software modules like 
the physical prototype. This application was useful to test the suspect state and the related 
restart policy. In fact, the implementation in the physical prototype was more complex due 
to the need of reinitializing all hardware and software components without cutting the 
connection with the EVC. 
The second prototype focused on wireless maintenance functionalities and included 
PCs corresponding to the BD and MC roles. Linux Gentoo [17] was selected as operating 
system thanks to its good performance in embedded platforms. Furthermore, Linux has 
open source code for wireless communications and provides better accessibility to hard-
ware related information needed for performance monitoring and error detection. 
An ad-hoc mode was selected for the wireless link between BD and MC. WPA-PSK 
was available as authentication method in ad-hoc mode with a strengthened security em-
ploying PBKDF2 key derivation functions. For securing wireless communication between 
BD and MC, LowSL was based on IPsec protocol thus achieving confidentiality, authen-
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ticity and integrity of the transmitted messages. Most of the IPsec software architecture is 
already included in the Linux kernel. OpenIKEv2 [18] library was chosen for managing 
setup of IPsec connections and the specific key exchange procedure. 
Finally, from the third integrated prototype important information was derived about 
the required characteristics of maintenance tools to be used with a wireless communica-
tion. At least longer delays have to be considered in such a situation, especially in the pre-
liminary phase for the session establishment. 
3. Evaluation of the DMI 
The evaluation task concentrated on four targets. The DMI was evaluated focusing on the 
safety and availability of the architecture (Section 3.1), understanding the behavior and 
efficiency of the error detection techniques (Section 3.2), and analyzing the real-time 
properties. The communication between the DMI and its environment was evaluated fo-
cusing on the performance and dependability properties of the wireless communication 
(Section 3.3), and the detection properties of the applied safety codes (Section 3.4). 
3.1 Model Based Evaluation of the Architecture and the Safety Mechanisms 
The quantitative safety, reliability and availability requirements necessitated the evalua-
tion of the DMI architecture and the related safety mechanisms. A model-based approach 
was adopted by constructing the state-based stochastic dependability model of the archi-
tecture. This model represents how the activation of a fault in a hardware component may 
lead to a detected error (that is either successfully handled by the recovery mechanism or 
leads to the Safe mode), or potentially to an undetected error at system level (that is con-
sidered as a hazard). Parameters of the model include the components’ fault occurrence 
rates, the error propagation probabilities, the coverage and latency of the periodic tests 
and other error detection mechanisms. Stochastic Activity Networks (SAN, [10]) was se-
lected as the formalism for the construction of the dependability model since (besides rep-
resenting states and state transitions) it allows specifying complex conditions and actions, 
general firing time distributions, reward functions and easy composition of sub-models. 
Since the DMI has a relatively complex architecture including several hardware re-
sources and software tasks, we followed a modular modeling approach: dependability sub-
models were assigned to (i) the hardware resources, (ii) the software components, (iii) the 
error propagation among them, (iv) the error detection mechanisms, and finally (v) the 
system level error handling (i.e., the suspect mechanism). The hazardous failures were 
considered as undetected failures at the task level. The dependability model construction 
approach can be summarized in the following steps: 
1. The dependability sub-models enumerated above were constructed manually, inte-
grating expert knowledge with regard of failure modes, ways of error propagation, er-
ror detection and error handling mechanisms, following the principles described in 
[11]. The corresponding SAN subnet templates were collected in a subnet library. In 
Figure 3 we present the subnet assigned to a hardware component. Transition fault oc-
currence models the occurrence of faults, its parameter is the fault rate. These faults 
may be relevant to different tasks (Taski_Errors) that use this resource, the propaga-
tion probabilities are characterized by the ratio of the usage of this resource. The oc-
currences of permanent faults are registered separately to model how periodic tests 
(with given rate and coverage parameters) can detect these faults. A detected error 
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triggers a change in the DMI operational mode (HWTrigger). Periodic tests and 
startup tests can be activated only in the corresponding operational mode. 
2. To support the composition of the subnets, the UML model of the DMI architecture 
(that included the hardware components, the software components and the service us-
age relations among them) was extended: stereotypes and tagged values were used for 
specifying the components’ types and the related dependability parameters. 
3. The dependability model was constructed by our automated tool [12] which identified 
the different components, relations and parameters on the basis of the UML model 
then instantiated and connected the corresponding SAN subnets from the library. 
 
Figure 3: Subnet belonging to a hardware component 
The probabilistic calculations, i.e., solution of the dependability model by computing the 
mean time to failure (reaching Safe mode) and mean time to hazard were performed by 
the Möbius tool [9] applying simulation. Sensitivity analyses were performed by specify-
ing the ranges of the different design parameters and examining their effects on the system 
level measures. As an example, Figure 4 presents how the hazardous failure rate depends 
on the error detection coverage of the applied control flow checking technique. 
The main results of the evaluation can be summarized as follows: The DMI prototype 
fulfils the reliability and safety requirements. The error detection coverage of the on-line 
error detection mechanisms has a crucial effect on the hazardous failure rate: if the dupli-
cated execution and comparison is replaced by a less efficient technique, or the error de-
tection coverage of control flow checking decreases below 50% (see Figure 4) then the SIL 
2 safety requirement (i.e., that the hazard rate remains less than 10-6 per hour) cannot be 
satisfied. The rate and coverage of periodic testing activities have less significant effects, 
the reasonable values allow to fulfill the SIL 2 requirement. 
A separate model was constructed to investigate the effects of DMI failures on train 
missions and QoS parameters observable by the passengers. On the basis of analyzing the 
influential effects, additional sub-models were constructed that represent the interactions 
with the on-board computer, the potential switchover to on-board spare DMI (that can 
increase availability), and the train missions. Two types of communication protocols were 
analyzed that could be applied in the interactions with the on-board computer: in a cyclic 
exchange of messages the EVC periodically checks the operational status of the DMI, 
while in the acyclic case the failure of the DMI is detected only if an aperiodic request is 
sent to the DMI and no proper answer is received. The probability to successfully com-
plete a mission without unscheduled train stops, and the steady-state availability of the 
overall system were computed. The evaluation pointed out the improvements in adopting 
an acyclic protocol (in case of a DMI failure this protocol increases the chance to boot a 
spare DMI and switch to it between two EVC requests). Sensitivity analysis quantified the 
effects of applying different aperiodic timeouts and faster boot procedure. 
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Figure 4: Hazardous failure rate (per hour) vs control flow checking coverage 
3.2 Experimental Evaluation by Fault Injection 
Experimental evaluation was performed by fault injection [22] campaigns to understand 
the efficiency of the safety mechanisms adopted in the DMI prototype. Due to risk of 
damaging the DMI hardware, only software fault injection was applied (i.e., effects or 
hardware faults were simulated by injecting changes in software). The fault injection 
framework was composed basically of (i) a low-priority thread (composed of a few in-
structions to guarantee negligible perturbation) that performs the run-time injection of 
faults or fault sequences, (ii) a fault library that enlists the faults to inject and (iii) a moni-
tor (based on the existing logging facilities of the DMI) that collects events and allows 
off-line analysis of the results. The workload was generated by means of an EVC Packet 
Generator that simulates the EVC by sending a pre-determined set of packets to the DMI. 
The faults can be subdivided in two categories: (i) faults implemented adding extra 
code in existing DMI functions (these faults are activated in run time by setting a specific 
parameter to true), they allow testing specific safety mechanisms of the DMI, and (ii) 
faults injected by additional software functions (e.g., injecting erroneous bytes in random 
areas of the RAM). 
 
Figure 5: Results of eight fault injection tests (seconds) 
Both qualitative assessment of the correct behavior of the safety mechanism under test 
(yes/no verdict of proper detection and coverage), and quantitative evaluation of the error 
detection techniques were performed. The main measurands identified for quantitative 
evaluation are two time intervals: (i) detection latency (time elapsed from the injection of 
an error and its detection) and (ii) reaction (after detection, time needed to transit to Sus-
pect mode). A Type-B uncertainty according to [24] for the time intervals was computed 
to be ±4 milliseconds. As example, in Figure 5 the “reaction” and “detection latency” for 
eight executions of a fault injection causing erroneous control flow in the audio manage-
ment function are shown. The wrong signature is injected at second 30. While reaction is 
a stable value, detection latency varies, because of fluctuations in scheduling activities and 
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in the timing of the EVC Packet Generator. Full details of the fault injection tool and ex-
periments are reported in [23]. 
3.3 Evaluation of the Wireless Communication Properties 
Evaluation of the designed wireless communication solution focuses on the study of sys-
tem behavior in terms of commonly used parameters, such as throughput, delay, packet 
error and packet drops at different layers of the protocol stack. The main emphasis is on 
the throughput estimation, as this estimation can be directly linked with the requirements 
on communication protocols. It is assumed that a maximum of 20 Mb is to be uploaded 
distributed on 10 files of approx. 2 Mb each. Considering the performance requirement of 
maximum download time of 5 min, the corresponding mean throughput is at least 67 Kb/s. 
The wireless communication protocols were evaluated using analytical, simulation 
and experimental approaches. Analytical and simulation approaches have a controllable 
environment; however, their accuracy depends on how well the underlying models reflect 
the reality. A simulation model was constructed that corresponds to the SAFEDMI wire-
less communication solution and its operating environment. It has been implemented in 
NS-2 [13] with relevant channel model extensions to enable detailed wireless link proper-
ties at layers 1 and 2 including bit error rate (BER), interference, Rician fading, and accu-
rate MAC functions. Furthermore, to support the analytical and simulation results real 
experiments were conduced to determine achievable performance of a 802.11 based wire-
less link in the SAFEDMI setup. The testbed was similar to the one described in Section 
2.3, its basic functions and components are as follows: 
- PCs represented the DMI, BD and the MC. BD and MC were connected using 802.11 
a/b/g enabled network interface cards setup in ad-hoc mode. To enable the configura-
tion case an FTP server (client) were installed in the MC (DMI, respectively). 
- The wireless connection was pre-configured with IPsec security associations. Net-
work address translation was defined for IPsec secured ports in the BD for forwarding 
traffic between the DMI and MC. 
The analytical modeling of the communication system behavior is a challenging task 
as it is a system exhibiting complex behavior. We adopted a modular approach: the over-
all model is split into several sub-models that are tied together. Defining multiple sub-
models enables their individual development primarily with the purpose of complexity 
reduction. The output of one sub-model is used as an input for the subsequent sub-models. 
The used feed-forward approach is illustrated in Figure 6. The definition of sub-models can 
partially be based on layers of the protocol stack. This allows a starting point in already 
studied models such as channel models. The complete description of the sub-models used 
and the complete set of results can be found in [23]. 
 
Figure 6: The feed-forward modeling chain 
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Measurement, simulation and analytical results corresponding to the case of good 
channel conditions (wireless transmitter and receiver are located close; signal strength 
about -50dBm) are presented in Table 2. Looking at goodput and Round Trip Time (RTT), 
there is a good resemblance between the results. As we observed in our studies, the most 
significant influence to RTT is caused by the waiting time in the queue. The good resem-
blance in the results indicates that queue size in simulation and analytical model is rea-
sonably defined with respect of the real setup. Another reason is that TCP maximum win-
dow size in the simulation and the analytical model, as presumably in the real setup, is 
limited to 64Kb of unacknowledged segments. This clearly also limits how many pack-
ets/frames are put in the queue effectively. 
Table 2: Evaluation results (M measurement; S simulation; A analytical) 
 Transmission 
rate 
Goodput, 
KB/s 
Round Trip 
Time, s 
Frame 
Error Rate  
Packet 
Error Rate  
11 630 0.072 0.011 0.003 
5.5 397 0.100 0.018 0.004 
M 
1 89 0.501 0.021 0.011 
11 636 0.105 0.059 0 
5.5 418 0.160 0.057 0 
S 
1 102 0.637 0.055 0 
11 607 0.107 0.018 0 
5.5 410 0.159 0.017 0 
A 
1 104 0.624 0.016 0 
From our studies considering different environmental and interference parameters we 
could conclude that the performance requirements are satisfied under a large range of 
conditions. From measurements and modeling we have observed that packet losses are 
rare. Frame losses on link layer increase delay due to the retransmission mechanism, but 
do not lead to significant packet losses. As we are dealing with a non delay-sensitive ap-
plication, increase in delay has almost no impact on TCP performance. 
3.4 Analysis of the Detection Properties of the Safety Codes 
This subtask focused on the analysis of the detection properties of the applied detection 
codes. The detection codes are used in the DMI in communication functions and for the 
purpose of performing integrity checks of data files or internal data structures (e.g., in 
ROM). This is essential for ensuring the error detection coverage needed to satisfy the 
quantitative safety target. A malfunction of a detection code is assessed by computing the 
probability of an undetected error. In order to quantify this parameter for the linear detec-
tion codes, the model of a Binary Symmetrical Channel (BSC) was used. 
The investigated codes can be split into several groups, depending on the purpose of 
their use. The most important group comprises the detection codes of the safety protocol 
layers (safety codes). This group contains the safety codes used in the on-board communi-
cation (CRC_SL2 and CRC_SL4) and the detection codes used for file integrity checks. 
The majority of the investigated codes are shortened cyclic codes. For this type of 
codes, the inherent computational complexity of the BSC calculation can be reduced by 
several techniques. Our analysis was based on the calculation of weight distribution with 
the help of a dual code [15] and on studies of the extreme behaviour of the undetected 
error probability Pud(pe)  [14] where pe is the bit error probability. Our results point out 
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that the complexity of the BSC analysis is viable for up to 48 redundant bits and for a 
maximum of 5MB data on a current PC. 
The detailed analysis showed that the SAFEDMI related safety targets are fulfilled. 
However, the studies demonstrated that none of the investigated CRC codes ensures that 
the probability of an undetected error is less than the usually used bound 2-c (where c is 
the number of redundant bits) for all possible lengths of codewords. At the worst case 
(CRC_SL2 with the codeword length 72 bits) the result is 50 times higher than the men-
tioned bound [14]. 
 
Figure 7: Pud(pe)-2-32 for CRC_Cast (codeword lengths vary from 120 to 144 bits) 
One of the proposed CRC codes for file integrity checks was the 32 bit long CRC_Cast 
analysed by Castagnoli et al. [15]. This CRC is closer to the 2-c bound than other CRCs, 
but the probability of an undetected error of this code is not upper-bounded by this value 
(at the worst case the result is 1.0000014 times greater than the bound). 
To get the results presented in Figure 7, it was necessary to apply high precision arith-
metic for the calculation of the extreme behaviour: the Newton's method for finding the 
zero points of the derivation of the function Pud(pe) was used in the Maple tool. 
4. Conclusions 
The design, prototyping and evaluation activities of the SAFEDMI project demonstrated 
that (i) a DMI fulfilling the SIL 2 requirements can be realized using off-the-shelf hard-
ware components and software implemented safety mechanisms, and (ii) providing a safe 
and secure wireless maintenance is feasible. The main results of the project include the 
thoroughly evaluated architecture design, the quantitative evaluation methodology inte-
grating analytic, simulation based and experimental techniques, and also a comprehensive 
testing framework including a set of re-usable testing tools. 
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